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Abstract
Similar brain regions are involved when we imagine, observe and execute an action. Is the same true for emotions? Here, the
same subjects were scanned while they (a) experience, (b) view someone else experiencing and (c) imagine experiencing
gustatory emotions (through script-driven imagery). Capitalizing on the fact that disgust is repeatedly inducible within the
scannerenvironment,wescannedthesameparticipantswhilethey(a)viewactorstastethecontentofacupandlookdisgusted
(b) tasted unpleasant bitter liquids to induce disgust, and (c) read and imagine scenarios involving disgust and their neutral
counterparts. To reduce habituation, we inter-mixed trials of positive emotions in all three scanning experiments. We found
voxels in the anterior Insula and adjacent frontal operculum to be involved in all three modalities of disgust, suggesting that
simulation in the context of social perception and mental imagery of disgust share a common neural substrates. Using effective
connectivity, this shared region however was found to be embedded in distinct functional circuits during the three modalities,
suggesting why observing, imagining and experiencing an emotion feels so different.
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Introduction
‘‘Disgust refers to something revolting, primarily in relation to
the sense of taste, as actually perceived or vividly imagined; and
secondarily to anything which causes a similar feeling, through the
sense of smell, touch and even eyesight’’ Charles Darwin (1872/
1965)
The concept of ‘simulation’ is important for our understanding of
imagination and social perception. For actions, simulation accounts
ofimaginationproposethatwecanaccuratelyimaginewhatitfeelslike
to perform actions because common brain areas are involved in the
execution and imagination of these actions. Empirical evidence
showing parietal, pre-/supplementary motor cortex activations
during imagination and action-execution supports this account [1–
5]. Simulation accounts of action perception posit that we intuitively
feel what others do and can anticipate their future actions because
our perceptual apparatus links their actions with neural structures
planning our own actions. Empirical support for this comes from the
discovery of mirror neurons in the premotor and inferior parietal
cortex of the macaque monkey responding to perception and
execution of similar actions [6–9] and the observation of human
premotor and inferior parietal responses to observation and
execution of actions [10–16].
Together, evidence for action simulation, perception and
imagination implicates brain areas including the premotor and
posterior parietal regions as neural substrates involved in three
functions: motor execution, observation and imagination. Perhaps
the brain does not need to duplicate the motor expertise stored in
motor areas in order to permit imagination and social perceptive
processes: at least in part, it employs the very hardware of our own
actions. However, it is unclear whether these notions can be
extended to the realm of emotions.
Neuroimaging studies have shown that while individuals view or
become aware of the delight [17], pain [18–21] or disgust
[17,22,23] of others, they activate the anterior insula and adjacent
frontal operculum (IFO) that reacts to experience of similar
emotions and is modulated by empathic tendencies. IFO lesions
also disrupt experience and recognition of disgust, suggesting a
role for this region in emotional simulation/understanding
[24,25].
Interestingly, similar IFO regions have been shown to be
recruited during affective autobiographical recall [26,27], and
taste imagination of pictured food items [28]. In line with these
results, emerging evidence points to the functional significance of
this region in facilitating awareness per se [29]. Thus in addition to
deficits in disgust perception and experience, lesions of IFO has
been shown to result in marked reduction of feelings of craving for
cigarettes in long term smokers [30,31], anosognosia [32] and
amusia [33].
Given the well documented role of the IFO in coding
experience and social observation of disgust (among other feeling
states), an interesting question would be whether this area would
similarly respond to individuals vivid imagination of disgusting
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how the functional circuitry that includes the IFO differs between
the imagination, observation and experience of disgust. In with the
emerging role of this region in coding awareness of feeling states, it
was hypothesized that a common IFO region involved in the
experience and observation of disgust [17,23], will be involved in
imagination and that the functional connectivity between this
region and the rest of the brain will differ across experience,
observation and imagination of disgust.
Materials and Methods
Participants: 12 healthy right-handed volunteers (6 females)
were recruited for the three fMRI experiments. All 12 individuals
were free of neurological, psychiatric and other physical conditions
with normal or corrected to normal vision. They completed the
consent forms approved by the University Medical Center
Groningen’s institutional review board and were paid 50 euros
in total for their participation to observation, experience and imagination
experiments.
Observation and Experience: The experimental procedures for the
observation and experience conditions of this study have been
described earlier [17], but are briefly illustrated in Figures S2
and S3.
Imagination: Similar to the observation and experience experi-
ments, the script-driven imagery runs consisted of three different
conditions: disgust, neutral and pleasant (but the data of the
pleasant condition is not of interest to the present report). Written
scenarios (scripts) with an approximate reading time of 35 seconds
were developed to induce disgust (9 scripts), neutral (7 scripts) and
pleasant (8 scripts) emotional feeling states, totaling to 25 scripts
(see Supplementary Materials S1 for sample scripts).
Initially, 11 participants that did not take part in the fMRI study
rate all 25 scripts as to the amount of disgust and pleasure they
experience while reading and imagining themselves going through
the scenarios of the scripts and how hard the scripts were to
imagine. We asked two additional participants to tell us which
script they read most quickly, and then measured their reading
time with a chronometer. The shortest reading time was just over
20 s, which is why 20 s was used as the upper limit of the surface
under the curve analysis described below (For additional
information, see Supplementary Materials).
For the final experiment, each of the participants rated all 25
scripts in terms of how disgusting, how pleasant and how hard to
imagine (on a scale ranging from 0 to 6). These ratings served two
purposes: first, to choose on an individual basis the 6 most
disgusting, the 6 most pleasant and the 6 most neutral (i.e. least
disgusting or pleasant) scripts for the fMRI experiment, and
second, to obtained personal ratings of the scripts used in the fMRI
experiment (Figure S1).
During scanning, (Figure S4) each trial begins with a red
fixation cross lasting 6 seconds followed by a script present as a
single screen of text lasting 35 seconds followed by a fixation cross
lasting 6 seconds. The subjects then viewed a screen with a simple
arithmetic task for 6 seconds, and had to indicate their choice by
pressing the right or left button of a response box with their right
index finger. The next trial then begun with 6 seconds of fixation
cross and the next script and so on. We included the arithmetic
task between two scripts to maintain attention and wash out the
emotional state induced by the scripts between two scripts. Each
run contained 9 trials (3 disgust, 3 neutral and three pleasant
scripts, all presented in a fully randomized order) and two such
runs lasting 9.35 minutes each were administered for the
imagination experiment.
Image Acquisition and Analysis: Images were acquired using a
Philips 3T whole-body scanner (Best, The Netherlands) using a
circular sense head coil. T2*-weighted echo-planar sequencing
was performed with 39 interleaved 3.5 mm thick axial slices with
0 mm gap (TR=2000 ms, TE=30 ms, flip angle=80u,
FOV=224 mm, 64664 matrix of 3.563.563.5 mm voxels). At
the end of each functional scan, a T1-weighted anatomical image
(16161 mm) parallel to the bicommissural plane, covering the
whole brain was acquired.
Statistical Parametric Mapping (SPM2; Wellcome Department
of Cognitive Neurology, London UK; http://www.fil.oin.ucl.ac.
uk) was used for the preprocessing and analysis. All functional
volumes were realigned to the first acquired volume and images
were then coregistered to the participant’s anatomical space and
subsequently spatially normalized to obtain images with a voxel
size of 26262 mm [34]. All volumes were then smoothed with an
8 mm full-with half-maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. For the
time series on all 12 participants, high-pass filters with cut-off
points at 106 s, 310 s and 380 s for the observation, tasting and
imagination conditions respectively, were included in the filtering
matrix in order to remove low-frequency noise and slow-drifts in
the signal. Condition-specific effects at each voxel were estimated
using the general linear model. Contrast images were then tested
at the group level using a one tailed t-test against zero to
implement a random effects analysis. We extracted the timecourse
from the IFO ROI that was found to be commonly active during
the observation and experience [17] for all three experimental
conditions using marsbar (http://marsbar.scourceforge.net;
M.Brett, J.-L. Anton, R. Valabregue, and J.-B. Poline, ROI
SPM toolbox, Abstract).
Connectivity Analysis: To explore the functional integration
between the shared circuit mechanism in the IFO and other
related regions during the three disgust modalities, we employed
the psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis implemented in
SPM to identify voxels whose timecourse correlated more strongly
with the timecourse of activity in IFO during the disgust compared
to the neutral condition for imagination, observation and taste
separately using the procedures advised by Friston and colleagues
[35]. The seed region for this analysis was determined in each
condition and subject separately by opening the relevant contrast
in SPM (e.g. vision of disgust – vision of neutral), placing the
cursor at the center of the IFO ROI (x=42, y=18, z=26) and
defining a 5 mm radius sphere using the function VOI. This
function will automatically move to the closest voxel with a
significant contrast (at p,0.005 uncorrected), and the actual
center of the sphere therefore deviated on average by 4 mm from
the center of the ROI (see Table S2), but their was no significant
difference between the spatial distribution of centers in the three
modalities (two-tailed matched pair t-test performed separately on
the x, y and z coordinates for imagination vs. observation,
imagination vs. taste and observation vs. taste, all p.0.25
uncorrected). The PPI analysis multiplies point by point the
timecourse of activity in the sphere seed region with a
psychological variable containing the value 1 for the condition
disgust, 21 for the condition neutral and zero elsewhere and then
uses this interaction vector, next to both the timecourse of the seed
region and the psychological variable as three regressors in a
subsequent whole-brain GLM analysis. Comparing the parameter
estimate of the interaction term with zero at the second level of
analysis (one-tailed t-test comparing n=12 parameter estimates
against zero) then identifies voxels in the population of 12
participants that are on average functionally more connected to
the seed region in the disgust condition compared to the neutral
condition (Friston et al., 1997). These PPI maps were then
Imagine Disgust in Your Insula
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10 voxels.
Results
Script ratings
Before scanning, the twelve participants included in the fMRI
experiment rated (Figure S1) the 6 disgust scripts as more disgusting
than the neutral ones (two-tailed matched pair t-test, p,0.001
uncorrected for multiple comparisons) but their was no significant
difference between the disgusting and neutral scripts in terms of how
pleasant (p.0.07) or how hard they were to imagine (p.0.87). The
pleasant scripts that served to balance the experimental design but
that were not further analyzed here differed from the other scripts in
that they were less disgusting than the disgust script (p,0.001), more
pleasant than both the other types of scripts (p,0.001). Finally, the
disgusting scripts were slightly more disgusting than the pleasant
scripts pleasant (p,0.04).
Timecourses
In Jabbi et al. [17], a region of the IFO was significantly more
active during the vision and the experience of disgust compared to
their neutral control conditions (p,0.005 vision of disgust – vision
of neutral and p,0.005 taste of quinine – taste of neutral solution,
Fig. 1a). To examine if this region is also recruited during the
imagination of scenarios involving disgust (compared to those
without emotional valence) we extracted the signal from this ROI
in the imagination condition for the 12 participants that returned
to be scanned during the imagination of emotional scripts (Fig. 1b;
Traditional GLM results for all three modalities are specified in
Table S1). Given that it is difficult to know how the emotional state
of the participants fluctuates during the reading of the scenarios,
we did not use a standard GLM approach but instead calculated
the surface under the average difference curve between the disgust
and neutral scenarios for the interval 4 s–20 s for each individual.
The first 4 s were excluded because of the hemodynamic response
delay and time points after 20 s, to exclude volumes in which some
of the participants had finished reading some of the scripts. One of
the core goals of the present study being the examination of a
shared IFO representation of the simulation (imagination),
experience and social observation of emotional feeling states, we
therefore employed a one-sample t-test (one tailed) comparing the
surfaces of the 12 participants against zero and found the disgust
scenarios significantly (p,0.004) recruit the IFO ROI more than
neutral scenarios during imagination. Timecourses of the IFO
ROI during the observation and experience of disgust are also
shown for illustrative purposes [17,23].
Functional Connectivity
To examine the functional circuitry within which the IFO is
embedded in these three disgust modalities (observation, imagi-
nation and experience), we used the time course of the IFO (based
on a 5 mm sphere centered on the voxel with a significant
omnibus test closest to x=42, y=18, z=26, see methods) as the
seed region to map effective connectivity using three separate (one
per modality) psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis [35].
This analysis was performed separately for each participant, and
the parameter estimates of the interaction term tested against zero
at the population level using a one-tailed t-test to determine which
voxels consistently increased their functional connectivity with the
IFO during the disgust condition compared to the neutral
condition. Results are shown in Figure 2 and Table 1.
During observation, we found only the ipsilateral right inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG, pars triangularis or BA 45 [36] to be effectively
more connected with the right IFO during the observation of facial
expressions of disgust relative to neutral faces (Table 1).
During experience and imagination condition, a much wider
network involving in particular somatosensory, motor, gustatory and
‘limbic’ regions were shown to be effectively more connected to the
IFO during the disgust compared to the neutral condition (Table 1).
Figure 1. Condition specific IFO time courses. a) coronal slice (y=18) showing the location of the ROI (white) previously shown to be involved
in the experience and observation of disgust (p,0.005, k.10 voxels) (Jabbi et al., 2007). b–d) time courses of the average disgust-neutral difference
relative to the onset of the movies of facial expressions, script-driven imagery and the administration of the tastants, respectively. Error bars represent
the standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.g001
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in these modalities was rare and restricted only to a single two-way
overlapping cluster between imagination and experience in the left
temporal pole.
Discussion
We tested and confirmed the hypothesis that the shared-
circuitry in the IFO, shown earlier to be active during experience
and observation of other people’s disgust [17,23], is also activated
by the imagination of one’s own disgust.
The IFO is thought to play an important role in interoceptive
awareness, i.e. sensing the inner state of the body [30,31,37–39].
This regions’ involvement in both the observation and experience of
disgust and pleasure [17,23] has been speculated to provide a
simulation mechanism of the inner state of disgust during disgust
observation in others. Findings showing IFO involvement in
experience and observation/awareness of other people’s pain [18–
21], suggested that this purported simulatory IFO response may not
be specific for emotions linked to gustatory or olfactory stimulation
but rather more generally linked to the simulation of bodily feeling
states during social cognition [40–41]. Independent evidence
Figure 2. PPI maps of the whole brain. Functional connectivity of the whole brain with the IFO (as seed) thresholded at the t=4.64
(corresponding to p,0.05 corrected for false discovery rate for the imagination of disgust relative to neutral). The numbers in the
figures shows the corresponding Z-coordinates in MNI space. Left is left and right is right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.g002
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p,0.001, k.10 voxels, t.4.64.
Observation PPI
Region MNI Voxels t-value z-value
XYZ
IFG BA45 56 30 12 26 6.35 4.04
Taste PPI
Region MNI Voxels t-value z-value
XYZ
Temporal Pole 248 5 221 147 7.98 4.5
SI/SII 250 214 31 134 8.32 4.59
255 223 51 12 5.51 3.74
Cingulate Motor 11 212 52 89 7.39 4.35
MI BA/3a/4a/4p 46 213 43 60 7.02 4.24
220 235 64 32 5.83 3.86
246 227 53 17 5.78 3.84
Orbitofrontal Cortex 228 12 215 37 6.67 4.14
MPFG 219 57 9 31 7.14 4.28
Putamen/Lentiform 222 22 12 30 5.18 3.61
Caudate 212 25 14 14 4.64 3.3
Globus pallidus 213 22 22 14 5.9 3.88
Angular gyrus/TPJ 240 262 33 28 5.76 3.83
ITG/MTG 56 2 29 23 5.62 3.78
49 2 230 12 4.98 3.53
ITG 46 258 25 21 6.31 4.02
239 28 231 18 5.57 3.76
Lingual Gyrus 226 267 25 10 5.33 3.67
ITG/MTG/STG 238 24 236 18 5.57 3.76
50 8 238 12 4.98 3.53
Posterior Insula 245 220 8 11 5.09 3.53
Cerebellum 41 258 234 12 4.98 3.53
20 252 228 19 8.5 4.63
224 255 229 14 5.41 3.7
Imagination PPI
Region MNI Voxels t-value z-value
XYZ
Mid&Post Insula/STG 50 8 24 1754 12.51 5.38
Lingual Gyrus 24 290 2 202 5.19 3.62
211 264 21 102 6.11 3.96
Temporal Pole/MTG 246 4 220 129 7.3 4.32
36 13 225 10 5.99 3.91
52 23 216 13 5.16 3.61
SMA/preSMA BA6 26 3 63 374 6.02 3.92
Amygdala 231 22 213 129 7.3 4.32
Hyppocampus 34 216 24 56 6.5 4.08
MI 19 217 73 28 7.42 4.36
ACC 215 12 37 57 7.24 4.3
IFG BA44/45 247 20 36 44 4.84 3.47
Posterior cingulate 28 0 45 33 4.99 3.54
Prefrontal gyrus/SFG 217 46 46 31 4.9 3.5
221 24 51 24 5.33 3.67
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imagination of basic emotions and sensations such as taste [26–28].
Our findings of a common IFO activation in the same
participants’ experience, observation and while they imagine
feeling disgust provides to our knowledge, the first direct evidence
indicating that two apparently distinct forms of simulation (social
perception and imagination) actually share a common neural
substrate in the IFO. These findings have two implications: First, it
supports the idea that imagination and social perception of
emotions may share neuroanatomical underpinnings. This is in
line with similar findings in the mirror neuron literature showing
common neural representations for perceived, executed and
imagined motor actions [6–9]. Second, it provides insights into
the neural basis of the captivating experience of reading a book:
While previous studies on social perception used movies of other
people’s experiences or arbitrarily colored symbolic cues, our
combination of movies and written material in the present
experiment demonstrates that reading (mental imagery) as well
as watching other people experience what is imagined recruits
brain regions involved in experiencing an emotion.
The IFO ROI selected in this study appears to be a key location
in the phenomenon of simulation that makes feeling an emotion,
seeing that emotion on someone else’s face and imagining that
emotion somehow shares a similar feeling component. Despite this
partial overlap, these three modalities of disgust however do feel
clearly different, emerge through distinct processes, and are
triggered by different events. During experience: the brain activity
is triggered by an unpleasant taste; during observation: by the sight
of disgusted facial expression; and during imagination: by vivid
mental imagery triggered by written scripts. Interestingly, these
differences seem to be reflected in our connectivity findings.
Our IFO ROI involved in all three modalities includes anterior
aspects of the insula and the adjacent frontal operculum, where the
postmortem cytoarchitectonic analysis of 5 human brains observed
a dysgranular cytoarchitecture [42], probably corresponding to the
dysgranular zone of the frontal operculum/insula [43]. Tracer
injections in the monkey Insula shows it to be highly intercon-
nected with most of the brain [44–46], in particular the motor
cortices (IFG-premotor, SMA/preSMA, M1 and cingulated motor
cortex), regions involved in gustation (basal ganglia, amygdala,
ACC, orbitofrontal cortex), somatosensation (SI, SII and posterior
Insula), high level vision (STS) and memory and semantics
(temporal pole and hippocampus). However, it is worth noting that
the monkey Insula does not have a homologue of IFO [47],
underscoring a likely prominent role for this phylogenetically new
region in higher order physiological awareness ‘‘that might be
absent in monkeys’’. Our effective connectivity findings showed
changes in the temporal correlation between the BOLD signal in
the IFO and a variety of putative human homologues of the
connected structures shown earlier to be connected with monkey
insula [43–46].
During experience, changes in effective connectivity occur
primarily with somatosensory (left SI/SII and posterior Insula)
[48], gustatory/ motivational (basal ganglia, orbitofrontal cortex),
and motor output regions (cingulated and primary motor cortex).
What do these changes in effective connectivity mean? The SI/SII
and the posterior insula are involved in somatosensation [49] and
could represent the tactile experience of tasted fluids - relatively
similar for neutral and unpleasant gustatory stimuli. The IFO
however increases activity as the intensity of the taste of a solution
increases as well as integrates the taste and texture of food [49]. The
observedIFO effective connectivitywith somatosensoryareasduring
disgust experience relative to tasteless artificial saliva may therefore
likely reflect the integration of texture and taste in the IFO. Indeed,
the orbitofrontal cortex, the basal ganglia and motor regions (M1
and cingulate motor cortex) are involved in evaluating the valence of
a taste [49] and regulating behavior accordingly [47]. Thus the
increase in effective connectivity between these regions and the IFO
may underlie the valence-related relevance of taste processing.
During imagination, participants need to (a) transform the
written material involved in the scripts into a mental simulation of
the actions, sensations and feeling states of the protagonists. All
scripts, be they disgust-inducing or neutral involved actions and
sensations, and this processing would therefore not be specific for
the disgust inducing scripts. Unlike the neutral scripts, imagining
the disgust inducing scripts naturally triggers strong feeling states
of disgust. Broca’s area (left BA44/45) and the left temporal pole
are structures that are known to be important for understanding
stories [50]. Thus, the increase of effective connectivity between
the IFO and these regions for the disgust scripts may likely reflect a
cognitive-affective integration mechanism. The SMA/preSMA
plays a key role in the mental imagery of actions [25, 51] and
somatosensory regions (right SI/SII/posterior Insula) play an
important role in the mental imagery of tactile and proprioceptive
sensation [48,51] and would therefore play an important role in
the imagery of actions and sensations in general. The change of
effective connectivity with the IFO however reflects that this motor
and somatosensory imagery seems to be linked to activity in the
IFO and feeling states more strongly, if these actions and
sensations are disgusting. Increases of connectivity with the
hippocampus finally could reflect autobiographic memories
triggered by the scripts [52].
During social observation, the most prominent region with
stronger connectivity during disgust compared to neutral faces was
the ipsilateral right BA45. This region has been shown to be
involved in execution, observation and imitation of facial
Imagination PPI
Region MNI Voxels t-value z-value
XYZ
Premotor cortex/BA6 38 217 42 67 5.05 3.56
259 28 39 10 4.64 3.38
MPFG 27 44 32 13 5.17 3.61
Putamen 30 8 10 11 5.19 3.62
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.t001
Table 1. cont.
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of any facial movement triggers a motor simulation of facial
expressions in the BA45 that might be related to the phenomenon
of facial mimicry [55,56]. If the facial expression is emotional
however, and disgusting in particular, an increase in effective
connectivity between this region and the IFO, would link a
simulation of the bodily feeling state of disgust with the simulation
of the disgusted facial expression. Indeed, whereas lesions of the
IFG resulted in widespread deficits in the perception of facial
expressions [57], lesions in the IFO lead to more focused deficits in
disgust recognition [24,25].
Conclusions
Humans can achieve vivid emotional feeling states in the
absence of actual emotional encounters in a myriad of ways,
including the recall of past experiences, the imagination of
hypothetical experiences, reading a good book, watching a good
movie or witnessing a friend’s experience. By making participants
view disgusted facial expression of others, read disgust provoking
scenarios and taste an unpleasantly bitter solution, we found a
modality a-specific involvement of a region of the IFO during
disgust. However, the functional connectivity between this region
and the rest of the brain was orchestrated in a modality specific way.
This suggests that the IFO is a convergence zone where bodily
feeling states relevant for the emotion of disgust are coded
according to a common code [58,59] regardless of stimulus
modality. Our findings of IFO involvement in all three modalities
supports the idea that simulation through both pre-reflective
(viewing someone else’s disgust) as well as reflective (deliberate
mental imagery and language) routes may therefore be comple-
mentary rather than independent of each other [60]. This idea is
supported by evidence showing dampening effect of people’s
expectation on their IFO response during exposure to aversive
tastes, suggesting a role for this region in regulating reflective/
cognitive processes relevant for homeostatic maintenance [61].
The functional relationship between the IFO and interconnected
regions during social cognition, as opposed to imaginary and
actual emotional experience remains an important question for
future work, but the relative lack of overlap between the results of
our effective connectivity analysis between the three modalities
confirms the idea that these modalities feel different despite the
presence of regions that encode them according to a common code
because they are embedded in distinct, and modality specific
neural circuitries [59,60]. In sum, our findings of IFO involvement
in the actual imagination of gustatory disgust are in support of the
important role of this region in regulating awareness and
embodiment of feeling states.
Supporting Information
Supplementary Materials S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.s001 (0.04 MB
DOC)
Figure S1 Script rating. The 12 participants of the fMRI
experiment rated all 25 available scripts on a scale ranging from 0–
6 according to how disgusting, how pleasant and how hard to
imagine they find them. On an individual basis, the 6 most
disgusting, the six most pleasant and the six most neutral (i.e. least
disgusting and least pleasant) scripts were then chosen for inclusion
in the fMRI experiment, and the average rating of the chosen
scripts shown in this figure (error bars representing the standard
error of the mean over the 12 subjects). * denote significant
matched-pair t-tests (2 tailed, p,0.01 uncorrected). Note that
ratings were only compared within each rating (i.e. the three
scripts were compared separately in terms of how disgusting they
were, how pleasant they were and how hard they were to imagine).
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.s002 (5.18 MB PDF)
Figure S2 Frames represent different time points of the 3 s
movies depicting facial expressions of disgust, neutral and pleased
gustatory experiences. See Jabbi et al., 2007 for detailed
description of this part of the methods.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.s003 (1.30 MB PDF)
Figure S3 Sequence of events within a single taste trial. The
person with the headphone represents an experimenter while the
individual lying supine represents a participant in the scanner with
three tubes protruding into a pacifier in the mouth through which
various tastants are delivered. See Jabbi et al. for detailed
description of this part of the methods.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.s004 (0.47 MB PDF)
Figure S4 Structure of an imagination trial in the scanner.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.s005 (1.65 MB PDF)
Table S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.s006 (0.10 MB
DOC)
Table S2
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0002939.s007 (0.05 MB
DOC)
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